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RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION APPLIED TO
THE STATES
The petitioner had been tried and convicted, in a Texas court, of
committing armed robbery. At trial the State had introduced the transcript of testimony taken of a witness at preliminary hearing. The petitioner, who was without counsel at preliminary hearing,' did not then
cross-examine that witness. The witness did not appear at trial, because
subsequent to the preliminary hearing he had left the state.2 At trial,
counsel for petitioner objected to the use of the transcript, contending
that its introduction violated the petitioner's right to confrontation of the
witnesses against him.
The conviction was affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. 8 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court the petitioner
again contended that his right to confrontation had been denied in the
state criminal proceeding: Held, reversed, the sixth amendment right of
confrontation is fundamental to a fair trial and is, therefore, made obligatory upon the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)."
1. Counsel was appointed for the defendant at the trial stage. The court declined to
decide whether due process requires counsel to be appointed at a Texas preliminary hearing.
Preliminary hearings have been held to be a critical stage in the prosecution in cases where
pleas of guilty can be entered at the hearing. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963);
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). At the Texas preliminary hearing it is decided
whether the defendant should "be bound over to the grand jury and if so whether he
should be admitted to bail." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 402 (1965). For a full discussion see generally, (2) Comment, The Right to Counsel Prior to Trial in State Criminal
Proceedings, 17 U. Mi.Ai L. REV. 371 (1963); (1) Fellman, The Right to Counsel Under
State Law, 1955 Wis. L. REV. 281; (3) Comment, An Historical Argument For the Right
to Counsel During Police Interrogation,73 YALE L.J. 1000 (1964).
2. The witness in question was the victm of the robbery. The state presented testimony
from the witness' sister that he had moved to California and did not intend to return to
Texas. Pointer v. State, 375 S.W.2d 293, 294 (1963). Texas law provides for the use of
prior testimony if the witness has left the state permanently. TEx. CODE OF CRim. PRO. ANN.
§ 749, 750 (1963).
3. The right of confrontation and cross-examination was not discussed by the Texas
court. It is interesting to note that the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for
armed robbery. The length of the sentence lends greater importance to the determination
of due process. Pointer v. State, Ibid.
4. The Supreme Court, on the same day, decided a companion case in which the petitioner
was convicted of attempted murder. In that case the State of Alabama had tried the two
accused parties in separate trials. At the petitioner's trial, the state read the other party's
confession into the record under the guise of refreshing memory. The first defendant had
refused to answer questions because of the possibility of self-incrimination. The petitioner
was unable to cross-examine him because he refused to answer questions on the basis of
his right to so refuse guaranteed by the Alabama and United States constitutions. The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, on the basis of the sixth amendment right of
confrontation. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
The Alabama court of appeals had affirmed the conviction asserting that the petitioner
had waived his right to object. Douglas v. State, 163 So.2d 477 (Ala. 1963). The transcript,
set out below, is worthy of note as a comment upon that assertion of the Alabama Court:
Q. Is that your signature (showing witness signature on confession)?
A. I'm not sure.
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The sixth amendment guarantees an accused many of the basic
features of fair trial procedure.5 However, this amendment standing
alone, has acted only as a limitation upon practices and procedures in
federal courts.6 The right to confront adverse witnesses, as given meaning
by the federal courts, has long been held to embody the right to crossexamine. 7 Professor Wigmore has described the right of confrontation
Mr. Esco: (Interrupting) If your Honor please, I object to the reading of any
document or purported confession,Mr. McLeod: (Interrupting) This is cross-examination.
The Court: Hostile witness. Overrule.
Mr. Esco: We except.
Q. I will ask you if on the night of January 20, 1962, in Selma, Alabama, in the
Dallas County jail if you didn't make the following statement: (Reading) I, Olin
Ray Loyd, make theMr. Esco: (Interrupting) I object to this being read in the presence of the jury.
Mr. McLeod: You've already got an objection in there.
Mr. Esco: I object to this being read in the presence of the jury.
The Court: We overrule.
Mr. Esco: We except.
(After the questions were read, defense counsel renewed his objections:)
Mr. Esco: I'd like first to object to the reading of this purported confession on
the grounds that it is hearsay evidence, that it was made outside the hearing of this
defendant, it was not subject to cross-examination, and we move to exclude it
from the evidence.
The Court: The court will deny your motion.
Mr. Esco: We except, if you please. And at this time, your Honor, we make a
motion for a mistrial on the ground that this jury has been so prejudiced from
these proceedings, and from the attempts of the prosecution to use illegal evidence,
that no fair and just verdict whatsoever could come from a jury that has been
so prejudiced.
The Court: Motion is denied.
Mr. Esco: We except, if you please.
Mr. Esco: We would like to make a motion for a new trial on the grounds that
the proceedings have been very irregular here today and we feel that it has been
prejudicial to this defendant.
The Court: Your objection is overruled. 380 U.S. at 421-22. (Emphasis added.)
5. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed . . . and to be informed of the' nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defense. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (Emphasis added.)

Mr. Justice Black commenting about the guarantees of the sixth amendment stated, "The
experience of centuries has demonstrated the value of these procedures to one on trial
for crime." Black, The Bill of Rights and the Federal Government, in THE GREAT RIGHTS
43, 52 (Cahn 1963). The fairness of the trial itself is also provided for by the fifth
amendment protection against self-incrimination and its guarantee of due process of law.
6. E.g., Gallegos v. State, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).;

West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258 (1904); People v. Smith, 174 Cal. App. 2d 129, 344

P.2d 435 (1959); Kinkaid v. Jackson, 66 Fla. 378, 63 So. 706 (1913); People v. Nisonoff,
293 N.Y. 597, 59 N.E.2d 420 (1944),, cert. denied, 326 U.S. 745 (1945).
7. To be confronted by the witnesses against him does not mean merely that they
are to be made visible to the accused . . . but it imports the constitutional privilege
to cross-examine them.... The constitutional right of confrontation is preliminary
to and but another name for the right of cross-examination. State v. Crooker, 123
Me. 310, 312, 313, 122 Atl. 865, 866 (1923).
Accord, Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S.
325 (1911); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). See also, OaRsILD, CRIMINAL PROCREuRE FROM ARRST TO APPEAL 325 (1947); McKAY, The Right of Confrontation, 1959
WAsHa. U.L. Q. 122; 5 WIGmORE, EVmENCE 1395 (3d ed. 1940).
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as an engrafting of the hearsay rule into the Constitution. Thus, the
use of hearsay exceptions such as dying declarations,9 testimony from a
former trial if cross-examination was available,' ° business records," and
official statements, 2 has been held to be consistent with the sixth amendment. Other exceptions to the hearsay rule may develop and it is quite
likely that they will not be held to constitute violations of the right of
confrontation. 8
A federal court may not admit: testimony from a former trial (if
the witness' absence is due to the government's negligence),"4 depositions
obtained by the government, 5 or statements made by a co-defendant if
no opportunity to cross-examine was available.'" In the usual federal
criminal trial,' 7 the witness must be confronted unless a specific common
8. WIGmoRE, Id. at § 1397, p. 131; accord. Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542
(1926), "The manifest reason for the inclusion of these protections in the Constitution was
to assure the same rights in this respect that were always familiar attributes of the common
law." McKay, id. at 125.
9. Dowdell v. United States, supra note 7 (dicta) ; Mattox v. United States, 146 U. S.
140 (1892); but see, Marshall v. Chicago G.E.R. Co., 48 Ill. 475 (1868) (civil trial) for a
strong criticism of the common law dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule as it
relates to fairness. This case has value as a critical re-examination of an old accepted concept.
10. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912) (accused offered testimony taken at
former trial and then the government used it) ; Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897);
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 240 (1895) (witness died between trials). Compare
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 160 (1878), holding the accused's right to confrontation
is not violated by the use of testimony from a former trial when the accused procured the
absence, with Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 471 (1900) holding that the accused's right
of confrontation is violated when the witness' absence is due to government negligence.
11. Weeks v. United States, 313 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 373 U.S. 922
(1964); United States v. Leathers, 135 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1943) (pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1732) ; Cooper v. United States, 91 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1937) (expert testified about account
books). But cf. United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 231 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
12. Dowdel v. United States, supra note 7; Kay v. United States, infra note 13, T'Kach
v. United States, 242 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1957) (white house employment records) ; United
States v. Woll, 157 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (government contracts).
13. Providing new exceptions are specifically needed and do not violate a presumption
of trustworthiness, dicta indicates their acceptance. Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied 358 U.S. 825; Mathews v. United States, 217 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.
1954). See also, McCoRmicx, EVIDENCE § 231 p. 487 (1954).
14. The witness was a federal prisoner who was negligently allowed to escape. Motes
v. United States, supra note 10.
15. United States v. Haderlein, 118 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Ill. 1953); See generally WICMORE,
op. cit. supra note 7 at § 1398 p. 140. It is not clear whether this is a constitutional limitation or one based on the lack of a federal statute. In either event it is illogical since testimony
from former trials is admissible when cross-examination was available. Of course, depositions should only be used for cause and when the defendant had an opportunity to crossexamine.

16. Douglas v. Alabama, supra note 4; Barton v. United States, 263 F.2d 894 (5th
Cir. 1959).
17. There has been, and is, significant controversy dealing with the right to confrontation in administrative hearings. This topic is beyond the scope of this paper. An insight
into that question may be gained from Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960) (Civil
Rights Commission); Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, [annot. 3 L. ED.2d 13773 (1959)
(Defense Department anti-communist board) ; Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955) (loyalty
of public health official); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), (loyalty
board), aff'd 341 U.S. 918 (1951). See generally, McKay, note 7 supra at 130-167; 1 DAvis
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law exception to this rule has been satisfied."8 For example, the sixth
amendment has been held to preclude the use of evidence of the prior
conviction of thieves to prove that a subsequent defendant received the
stolen goods.' 9
Few, if any, states fail to provide an accused defendant with the
right of confrontation, either by constitutional provision or by statute.20
However, state court interpretations of these provisions have varied considerably. Some state courts have allowed prosecutors the use of depositions, 2 1 and have sustained convictions based upon: information supplied
by confidential informers, hence unconfronted informers, 22 dying declarations,2 3 and testimony from former hearings, provided that there was
"adequate" opportunity for cross-examination. 24 The standard used to
determine the supposed adequacy of any opportunity for cross-examination, is, however, suceptible of criticism, especially in light of some of
the fact patterns in which the safeguards have been deemed "adequate."'2 5
ADmINISTRATIvE LAw § 7.13 (1958) ; Newman,

Due Process, Investigations and Civil Rights,

8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 735 (1961).
Contempt proceedings have been held to be covered by the sixth amendment. Merchant's
Stock & Grain Co. v. Board of Trade, 201 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1912)-; FED. R. Csme. P. 42;
Contra, Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957).
18. United States v. Douglas, 155 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1946); United States v. Angell
11 Fed. 34 (D.N.H. 1881) (absolute right) (witness absent without cause). Cf. Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (electronic eavesdropper).
19. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) held a federal statute unconstitutional
which established a conclusive presumption that goods received by an accused were stolen
if the transferor was convicted of theft. Cf. Barone v. United States, 205 F.2d 909 (8th Cir.
1953) (accessory after the fact).
20. Professor Wigmore lists 46 state constitutions with a right of confrontation and an
additional 2 states with statutory guarantees. V. WcmeoRE, EVIDENCE § 1397 n.1 (3d Ed.
1940); E.g., FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RiGmTS § 11 ("meet witnesses against him face to face").
21. Ryan v. People, 21 Colo. 119, 40 Pac. 775 (1895)!; State v. White, 7 Idaho 150,
61 Pac. 517 (1900); People v. Werblow, 123 Misc. 204, 205 N.Y. Supp. 617 (1924); People
v. Fish, 125 N.Y. 136, 26 N.E. 319 (1891); State ex rel. Drew v. Shaughnessy 212 Wis. 322,
249 N. W. 522 (1933). The above cases were decided on the premise that the sixth amendment was inapplicable to the states. But cf., dicta in: Kaelin v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky.
354, 1 S.W. 594 (1886); State v. Chambers, 44 La. Ann. 603, 10 So. 886 (1892) (no statute
of authorization).
22. Perez v. State, 151 So.2d 686 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963) ; Harris v. Commonwealth, 315
S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1958) (police "stooge" used to trap moonshiner).
23. E.g., Wray v. State, 154 Ala. 36, 45 So. 697 (1808) ; State v. Bethea, 241 S.C. 16, 126
S.E.2d 846 (1962); State v. Perkins, 32 Wash. 2d 810, 204 P.2d 207 (1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 862 (1949); Spencer v. State, 132 Wis. 509, 112 N.W. 462 (1907).
24. E.g., State v. Head, 91 Ariz. 246, 371 P.2d 599 (1962); Holt v. State, 34 Okla.
Crim. 283, 181 P.2d 573 (1947) ; State ex rel. Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Ore. 163, 269 P.2d
491 (1954) ; Pointer v. Texas, 375 S.W.2d 293 (1964) rev'd, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
25. A negro youth was tried for a felony and was not represented by counsel. He confronted the witnesses but the adequacy of his attempted cross-examination is doubtful. The
state court affirmed Poe v. State, 95 Ark. 172, 129 S.W. 292 (1910). The defendant, a 70
year old man, was tried and convicted of murder. He attempted to cross-examine at the
preliminary hearing wherein he was not represented by counsel: The state court overruled
the objection of the defendant notwithstanding testimony by the hearing magistrate that
the defendant apparently did not know how to cross-examine at all. Hill v. State, 58 Nev.
28, 68 P.2d 569 (1937).
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It then becomes apparent that there has been at least some variance
between the federal and state standards for confrontation. That variance
is a direct result of the pre-Pointernon-incorporation of sixth amendment
confrontation.
Authority stating that the sixth amendment did not apply to the
states is legion.2 6 In West v. Louisiana,27 the state introduced transcripts
of the testimony of a witness, who had appeared before the committing
magistrate, but, as a non-resident, did not return to Louisiana for the
defendant's trial. The Supreme Court unequivocally held that "the sixth
amendment does not apply to proceedings in state courts."2
This rule stood unaltered for over sixty years as a manifestation of a
federal system with distinctly different standards of criminal justice.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, in Pointer v. Texas, stated
in clear and concise terms that the right of confrontation "is of such a fundamental nature that it is made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth
amendment."29 The majority, following the doctrine of absorption, thus
manifested its will that the sixth amendment shall be applied to the states
in accordance with the federal standard." The Court, in making this
right obligatory upon the states, relied in part upon its previous application to the states of the sixth amendment guarantees of the right to counsel and the right to an open trial.8" The use of the absorption saves the
court from the necessity of having to determine, ad hoc, whether each
state proceeding has violated the due process guarantees. It commands
reliance upon the more definite federal standard, which deprives the states
of the latitude to further abridge rights now declared fundamental by the
Supreme Court.
The Pointer decision thus casts grave doubt on the tenability of
former state rulings that a sufficient right of confrontation can be afforded
to a defendant who was present at a hearing, but was not then represented
by counsel.82 Since the federal standard now will apply to the states, the
26. E.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1962) (confession of co-defendant) ; Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) ; see also cases cited in note 6 supra.
27. 194 U.S. 258 (1904)..
28. Id. at 202.
29. 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
30. Id. at 406. Mr. Justice Goldberg, speaking on the question for the first time, added
himself as a proponent of the absorption doctrine. (Id. at 410) (concurring). The doctrine of
absorption provides for the application of a right to state courts with the same force
and effect of the right in federal courts. Mr. Justice Black has suggested in numerous opinions
that the fourteenth amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights so as to make them all
applicable to the states. E.g., Adamson v. California, 382 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (dissent). Mr.
Justice Douglas, listed ten Justices who have agreed with that theory. Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (dissent). See generally Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. Rav. 1 (1956).
31. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)
(denial of the right of cross-examination is a denial of due process).
32. Supra note 25.
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question of the states' use of depositions will probably be tested in the
federal court system. It is predicted that the Supreme Court will allow
the states to use depositions provided that the defendant has an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine the deponent and there is significant need
to use the deposition. 3 The incorporation of the confrontation right will
not have a revolutionary impact upon the states since nearly all of them
already guarantee this right; however, it will require the application of
the stricter federal standard 4 and the implicit review by the Supreme
Court.
It is further predicted that notwithstanding Mr. Justice Harlan's
view3 5 that the doctrine of incorporation has been long discredited, the
march of piecemeal absorption shall continue until every guarantee of
criminal justice is made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth
amendment.
DONALD I. BIERMAN
33. See generally McCoRmiCx, EVIDENCE § 231 (1954)

for a discussion of the Supreme

Court's rejection of deposition usage on a policy rather than a constitutional basis.
34. An example of questionable state standards is demonstrated by the reproduction
of the record in Douglas v. State, supra note 4. See also Pointer v. State, supra note 29 at
408 (concurring in result on basis of due process).
35. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408-409 (1965).

